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VASUDEVAN ON JUDY BENJAMIN
Abstract. Anubav Vasudevan characterized van Fraassen’s “In-
fomin” solution to the Judy Benjamin Problem (i.e. the solution
by way of minimizing the Kullback-Leibler divergence between the
posterior and prior) as an implementation of a “brand of epis-
temic charity” taking “the form of an assumption on the part of
Judy Benjamin that her informant’s evidential report leaves out
no relevant information”. After an analysis of the example that
led Vasudevan to this way of thinking about Infomin, as well as of
a new one that supports the rival position of Douven and Romeijn
in favor of minimizing the inverse Kullback-Leibler divergence be-
tween the posterior and the prior, we come to a different and more
enlightening characterization of Infomin’s implicit assumptions.
1. Introduction
Van Fraassen (1981) invites us to consider a probabilistic puzzle in-
volving the fictional character Judy Benjamin (from the film “Private
Benjamin”). The puzzle, in essence, runs as follows: Judy has prior
credence function P = (p1, p2, p3, p4) = (
1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
) over some measur-
able partition (E1, E2, E3, E4) of an event space. A duty officer, who
is an expert relative to Judy (he knows more than she does), reports
to Judy that, according to his credence function, E3 is three times
as likely as E4. What should Judy’s posterior credence function be?
(Judy knows that the duty officer reports, always and only, this ratio.)
Recall that the Kullback-Leibler divergence (KL-divergence) between
Q = (q1, q2, q3, q4) and P (equivalently, the inverse IKL-divergence be-
tween P and Q) is given by
DKL(Q|P ) =
4∑
i=1
qi log
(qi
pi
)
= log(4) +
4∑
i=1
qi log(qi) = log(4)− E(Q).
Here E is the entropy of the partition Q. Van Fraassen suggests that
Judy update to that credence function Q for which DKL(Q|P ) attains
its minimum value, subject to the constraint q3 = 3q4. (In this case,
where Q attains maximum entropy, subject to the constraint.)
Vasudevan (2018) suggests a novel interpretation of Judy’s actions in
adopting this updating procedure:
1
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...in applying the principle of maximum entropy, Judy Ben-
jamin is not acting out of a concern to maximize uncertainty
in the face of new evidence, but is rather exercising a certain
brand of epistemic charity towards her informant. This epis-
temic charity takes the form of an assumption on the part of
Judy Benjamin that her informant’s evidential report leaves
out no relevant information.
Two things bothers us about this line on Judy’s actions. First, it’s a
central tenet of virtually all treatments of the Judy Benjamin Problem
that the duty officer always and only reports the likelihood of E3 rela-
tive to that of E4. Indeed, it’s fairly obvious that if one doesn’t set the
protocol in stone, there’d be no way to even begin to analyze the prob-
lem. So it isn’t clear to us what Vasudevan means by “her informant’s
evidential report leaves out no relevant information”, given that the
report always contains information of precisely the same type. In fact
it’s a truism, so far as we can tell, that the informant is leaving out
relevant information, for he could simply tell Judy what his credences
in E1 and E2 are, and these values only fail the test for relevance if
they are constant almost surely from Judy’s perspective.
Second, we have discovered a phenomenon whereby Judy’s posterior
credence in E1 ∨ E2 decreases as the duty officer’s expected amount
of additional information increases. And, whatever “her informant’s
evidential report leaves out no relevant information” in fact means,
it doesn’t plausibly imply that the informant’s expected information
exposure is vanishingly small–as it would at the least have to, to justify
her use of Infomin.
In this note, we will review the Infomin-friendly example Vasudevan
used to motivate his take on van Fraassen’s solution. Then we will look
at a second example in which it isn’t minimization of the Kullback-
Leibler divergence between Judy’s posterior and her prior that gives
the correct solution, but minimization of the inverse Kullback-Leibler
divergence. We’ll then make note of what is common to these examples
(namely the low expected information exposure of the informant) and
what is different, using these observations to renew discussion as to
Infomin’s implicit assumptions.
2. Two examples
In support of his rhetoric, Vasudevan imagines a scenario running more
or less as follows. Let n >> 1 be large. Imagine that a four sided die
has been subjected to n independent rolls. Judy and the duty officer
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both know that the die is fair, but only the duty officer knows the
outcomes of the rolls. What happens now is that a roll is selected
uniformly at random from the sample, and Ei is the event that the
selected roll landed i. The duty officer does not know which roll was
selected, so his credence function over the partition (E1, E2, E3, E4) will
defer to the relative frequencies of the 4 outcomes in the sample. Judy’s
credence function over this partition will of course be (1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
). The
duty officer now reports (always and only) the ratio of his credence in
E3 to his credence in E4, that is the ratio of “3 rolls” to “4 rolls” in the
sample. If the reported ratio is 3:1, what should be Judy’s posterior
credence function over the partition (E1, E2, E3, E4)?
This scenario is a “precisification” of the Judy Benjamin Problem; just
enough extra detail has been provided to compute a solution directly.
Since Judy will continue to regard the die as fair regardless of what
happens in the sample, she will assign all words of length n on the
alphabet {1, 2, 3, 4} (considered as outcomes for the entire experiment)
equal probability.
Denote by R(n) the set of quadruples (r1, r2, r3, r4) with each ri non-
negative, r1+r2+r3+r4 = n and r3 = 3r4. We introduce new variables
a, b and θ. These represent (assuming that ri represents the number
of i rolls in the sample) the relative frequency of 1, 2 and 4 rolls in
our sample, respectively. Also Q, which represents the duty office’s
probability function over (E1, E2, E3, E4), i.e.
Q = (a =
r1
n
, b =
r2
n
, 3θ =
r3
n
, θ =
r4
n
).
Next, some counting. For a fixed quadruple (r1, r2, r3, r4) ∈ R(n) the
number of words of length n having ri occurrences of i, i = 1, 2, 3, 4 is:
N(r1, r2, r3, r4) =
n!
r1!r2!r3!r4!
=
n!
(an)!(bn)!(3θn)!(θn)!
≈
√
2pin(n/e)n√
2pian(an/e)an
√
2pibn(bn/e)bn
√
6piθn(3θn/e)3θn
√
2piθn(θn/e)θn
=
1√
3abθ2aanbbn(3θ)3θnθθn
.
If we treat the triple (a, b, θ) as a continuous variable on the region
R = {(x, y, z) : x, y, z ≥ 0, x+ y + 4z = 1},
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the final fraction in the above display is maximized where the log of its
denominator is minimized, i.e. where
1
2
log(3abθ2) + n(a log a+ b log b+ 3θ log(3θ) + θ log θ)
=
1
2
log(3abθ2)− nE(Q)
is minimized. As n → ∞, the −nE(Q) term dominates and the
point where the minimum occurs will approach the triple (a∗, b∗, θ∗) ≈
(.26633, .26633, .11684) where E(Q) is maximized.
Now let B be a small ball centered at (a∗, b∗, θ∗), and put
T = inf
(a,b,θ)∈R\B
−E(Q).
Let B′ ⊂ B be a neighborhood of (a∗, b∗, θ∗) having the property that
for some T ′ < T , −E(Q) < T ′ whenever (a, b, θ) ∈ B′. Then when-
ever (r1, r2, r3, r4), (r
′
1, r
′
2, r
′
3, r
′
4) ∈ R(n) with the corresponding triples
satisfying (a, b, θ) ∈ R \B, (a′, b′, θ′) ∈ B′, one has
−E(Q′) < T ′ < T ≤ −E(Q).
Pick T ′′ strictly between T ′ and T . For n large enough, one will have
1
2
log(3a′b′θ′2)− nE(Q′)
<nT ′ < nT ′′ <
1
2
log(3abθ2)− nE(Q).
Taking the exponential of both sides then inverting,
N(r′1, r
′
2, r
′
3, r
′
4) > e
−nT ′ > e−nT
′′
> N(r1, r2, r3, r4),
so that
N(r′1, r
′
2, r
′
3, r
′
4)
N(r1, r2, r3, r4)
> en(T
′′−T ′) →∞ as n→∞.
Meanwhile it’s obvious that there is some M <∞ such that∣∣∣{(r1, r2, r3, r4) ∈ R(n) : (a, b, θ) ∈ R \B}∣∣∣
≤M
∣∣∣{(r′1, r′2, r′3, r′4) ∈ R(n) : (a′, b′, θ′) ∈ B′}∣∣∣
for all large enough n.
Denote by W (n) the set of words of length n on the alphabet {1, 2, 3, 4}
such that the letter 3 occurs exactly three times as often as the letter
4. For w ∈ W (n), denote by ri(w) the number of occurences of the
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letter i in w. Then set a(w) = r1
n
, etc. What the above calculations
show is that for any  > 0, there is a K so large that whenever n ≥ K,∣∣∣{w ∈ W (n) : (a(w), b(w), θ(w)) ∈ B}∣∣∣ > (1− )|W (n)|.
We may summarize as follows. Judy knows that the die is fair, so
her prior credence function over the results of the “selected” roll is
(1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
). An expert with additional evidence (statistics from an n roll
sample including the selected roll) reports, in effect, that exactly three
times as many rolls in this sample landed 3 as landed 4. Condition-
ing, Judy comes to have posterior credence function asymptotically (as
n→∞) approaching (a∗, b∗, 3θ∗, θ∗), in agreement with KL-divergence
minimization and the maximum entropy principle.
This is a correct analysis of the precisification under consideration. The
question, however, is whether setting its terms comes to nothing more
than implementing “an assumption on the part of Judy Benjamin that
her informants evidential report leaves out no relevant information”.
To shed light on that matter, we present an alternate scenario whose
solution matches with a rival updating scheme (defended in Douven
and Romeijn 2011 and Eva, Hartmann and Rad 2019) based on IKL-
divergence minimization.
In the alternate scenario, there is again a four sided die and there is
again a sample of size n. This time, however, Judy knows the statistics
of the sample. Namely, the die landed i exactly n/4 times, 1 ≤ i ≤ 4.
Also, this time the die is not assumed to be fair; the duty officer knows
the die’s true chance function (a0, b0, c0, d0) but Judy begins with some
continuous distribution, given by density function g, invariant over
permutations of the four sides, over the possible values of (a, b, c, d).
We will assume in particular that g > 0 a.e. (She hasn’t completely
ruled out any region.) Another change is that this time Ei denotes the
event that the outcome of the next roll of the die (i.e. a roll that is
independent of the sample) lands i. Finally, the duty officer reports
(always and only) the ratio c0 : d0. On this occasion, the reported ratio
is 3:1. What will be Judy’s posterior over the partition (E1, E2, E3, E4)?
After observation of the sample, Judy’s posterior density function is
given by
h(a, b, c, d) = kan/4bn/4cn/4dn/4g(a, b, c, d)
for an appropriate constant k. Since n >> 1, for reasonable g this dis-
tribution would in any event be tightly concentrated about (1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
),
but since g is assumed to be invariant under permutations of the vari-
ables a, b, c, d, we can assume more, namely that its expectation (that
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is, Judy’s prior credence function over the partition (E1, E2, E3, E4)) is
exactly (1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
, 1
4
). The report, meanwhile, teaches Judy that the true
chances lie on the surface
R = {(a, b, c, d) : a, b, c, d ≥ 0, a+ b+ c+ d = 1, c = 3d}.
The mode of her distribution over the chances restricted to R is at
that point (a, b, c, d) ∈ R where an/4bn/4cn/4dn/4g(a, b, c, d) achieves
its maximum. When n is large enough this will happen near the
point (a, b, c, d) ∈ R where abcd = 3abd2 is maximized. By symme-
try this maximum occurs at a point where a = b. The substitution
d = 1
4
(1 − a − b) followed by the substitution a = b shows that the
quantity to be maximized is a2(1 − 2a)2. This fourth degree polyno-
mial has zeros of multiplicity two at 0 and 1
2
. The sought-for maximum
therefore occurs at the midpoint of these, a = 1
4
. When n is large,
meanwhile, the distribution given by the density function h is highly
concentrated about its mode. So after hearing the duty officer’s report
when n is large, Judy’s posterior over the partition (E1, E2, E3, E4) is
≈ (1
4
, 1
4
, 3
8
, 1
8
), consistent with IKL-divergence minimization.
There are notable differences in these two scenarios.1 For example, in
the first scenario the duty officer has deductive information that Judy
lacks, but no inductive information. (Judy already knows the true
chances, screening off whatever inductive information the duty officer’s
random sample might otherwise have provided.) In the second scenario
the duty officer has inductive information that Judy lacks, but no de-
ductive information. (The partition in question is causally independent
of the evidence.) That’s an interesting distinction, but we hardly sees
how it justifies Vasudevan’s rhetoric. We don’t see, in particular, why
compliance with “assume that your informant’s evidential report leaves
out no relevant information” ought to entail compliance with “assume
that your informant’s additional evidence is purely deductive”. In-
deed, we don’t see any reason to think that the former injunction is
more or less compatible with the latter than it is with “assume that
your informant’s additional evidence is purely inductive.”
1Perhaps more interesting is what they have in common. As anyone following
the Judy Benjamin literature at all closely will already know, both of the update
methods being compared here (i.e. KL-minimization and IKL-minimization) expose
Judy to Reflection violations. These worsen as the duty officer’s expected amount of
information exposure (information that is relevant to the partition (E1, E2, E3, E4),
that is) increases, and vanish only as the duty officer’s expected information expo-
sure tends to zero. That is precisely what happens here as n → ∞. (The larger n
is, the more certain Judy is that the actual chances of the 4 possible outcomes lie
close to their relative frequencies in the sample.) So both scenarios are at the same
extreme in that sense, though they appear to lie at opposite extremes in another.
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Elsewhere, Vasudevan writes:
Such charity on the part of Judy Benjamin is analogous to
that which a student affords to an examiner in assuming
that a certain problem on an exam is well posed. Even if the
problem statement does not include any explicit claim to this
effect, the pragmatics of exam-sitting require the student
to extend charity to his examiner by presupposing that the
problem, as stated, does not leave out any information that
is relevant for determining its solution.
So far as we know, it’s only considerations of simplicity that can play
this role. So if, on an exam, I am asked to give the next term in the se-
quence 1, 4, 9, . . ., I should choose f(4) for the “simplest” function f(x)
such that f(1) = 1, f(2) = 4 and f(3) = 9; f(x) = x2 perhaps, for
which f(4) = 16. (Not, say, f(x) = 1
6
x3 + 11
6
x−1, for which f(4) = 17.)
But even assuming that “simplicity” places Judy in a “low information”
setting (see footnote 1), we don’t see that the Vasudevan scenario is
interestingly more simple than the alternate scenario we gave–though
each does exhibit simplicity of a kind, in that each seems to represent
an “extreme case”. One possible take on these matters is that the two
scenarios lie at opposite ends of a bipolar “low information spectrum”;
in problems where there is a clear-cut “simplest” solution, by contrast,
the spectrum of possible solutions is usually monopolar, with the sim-
plest solution lying at the unique pole. At any rate, we don’t find this
second piece of rhetoric to be all that perspicuous, either.2
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2Low information Brownian motion scenarios (which favor minimization of Eu-
clidean distance, resulting in posteriors tending to ( 518 ,
5
18 ,
1
3 ,
1
9 )) may complicate
the landscape of this spectrum. Such scenarios assume that the informant’s poste-
rior arises from an n-step random walk in which the variance of a single step is on
the order of n for small fixed  > 0. Vasudevan’s scenario, by contrast, arises from
an n-step random walk in which a single step is noticably asymmetric and has vari-
ance on the order of 1n2 . The extreme lowness of this variance makes the asymmetry
relevant, arguably in a way that is antithetical to “simplicity” considerations.
